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166 PEOPLE v. CHESSMAN [38 C.2d 
wage scale, which is based upon said data, is invalid, and 
we should so hold. However, because of the pledge of secrecy 
the commission should not be required to divulge the infor-
mation and therefore its order to the contrary should be made 
ineffective by prohibition, as is done by the majority opinion. 
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied January 
15, 1952. Edmonds, J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
[Crim. No. 5006. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1951.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. CARYL CHESSMAN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver. 
-An accused who of his own volition and with full knowledge 
of what he was doing waived assistance of counsel may not 
properly assert that denial of a continuance deprived him of 
a right to select counsel of his choice and deprived such coun-
sel of an opportunity to prepare, especially where the accused 
had the advisory services of a public defender throughout the 
trial. 
[2] !d.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Waiver.-A defend-
ant who intelligently refuses counsel and insists upon person-
ally conducting and controlling his defense does not lose the 
status of prisoner and become entitled to extraordinary privi-
leges not accorded defendants who are represented by coun-
sel, nor does he become entitled to proceed in a manner differ-
ent from that permitted attorneys. 
[1] See 7 Cal.Jur. 939; 14 Am.Jur. 882. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Crimimil Law, § 110; [3] Criminal 
Law, § 1067; [4] Criminal Law, § 96; [5] Criminal Law, § 264; 
[6] Criminal Law, § 1353; [7] Criminal Law, § 1092; [8] Crimi-
nal Law, § 464; [9, 10] Criminal Law, § 816; [11, 12] Criminal 
Law,§ 1434; [13] Criminal Law,§ 1418; [14] Criminal Law,§ 752; 
[15] Sodomy, § 11; [16] Sodomy, § 12; [17] Criminal Law, § 809; 
[18] Criminal Law, §1426; [19,31] Kidnaping, §2; [20] Kidnap-
ing, § 9; [21] Robbery, § 4; [22] Robbery, § 38; [23] Criminal 
Law,§ 358; [24] Robbery,§ 27; [25] Robbery,§ 33(1); [26] Rob-
bery,§ 48; [27] Criminal Law,§ 912(2); [28] Criminal Law,§ 614; 
[29] Criminal Law,§ 624; [30] Criminal Law,§ 348; [32] Kidnap-
ing,§ 1; [33] Criminal Law,§ 119; [34] Criminal Law,§ 144; [35] 
Criminal Law, § 1447. 
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[3] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Consolidation of Charges.-An ob-
jection to consolidating for trial crimes charged in separate 
informations may not be raised for the first time on appeal. 
[4] !d.-Venue-Change of Venue-Hearing and Determination.-
A denial of a motion for change of venue, sought on grounds 
stated orally only, is not subject to attack as having been ren-
dered without giving defendant opportunity to present a writ-
ten application as required by Pen. Code, § 1034, where a de-
nial on the merits is properly in the court's discretion, the 
denial appears not to have been based on the motion's form, 
defendant had ample time to prepare a proper application, and 
where the motion, made just before the jury were impaneled, 
came too late. 
[5] !d.-Trial-Requirement That Defendant Remain at Counsel 
Table.-Neither the presumption of innocence nor the elements 
of a fair trial require a court to conduct the trial of an accused, 
acting as his own counsel, without regard to the facts that he is 
charged with violent crimes and had been previously convicted 
of violent crimes, and the court may properly require him to 
remain at the counsel table in consideration of the safety of 
all persons in the courtroom. 
[6] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Denial of Defendant's Motion 
for Daily Transcript.-An accused who conducted his g>wn 
defense fails to establish a miscarriage of justice result-
ing from the court's denial of his motion for a daily tran-
script, notwithstanding the prosecutor received, apparently 
without court order, a transcription of certain parts of the 
trial which he used in his argument to the jury, where the 
accused was not prejudicially handicapped by want of a daily 
transcript and presented his case and delivered his argument 
without any indication of confusion or uncertainty. ( Const., 
art. VI, § 4%.) 
[7] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of CounseL-Improprieties 
in a prosecutor's conduct and the court's failure, of its own 
motion, to object thereto, do not constitute grounds for rever-
sal, where, notwithstanding the conduct could have been cor-
rected by objection at the trial, defendant, who chose to defend 
himself and required a skilled attorney sitting by his side to 
remain silent, failed to object in line with his technique of 
omitting objections. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Confessions.-Admission into evidence of cer-
tain confessions is not established as error or as depriving de-
fendant of due process on the ground that they were coerced, 
where his arguments as to asserted involuntariness merely re-
late to conflicting inferences of fact drawn against him by the 
court and jury, and hence do not show the confessions to have 
been given in circumstances inherently coercive. 
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[9] Id.-Instructions---Confessions.-It is not reversible error to 
instruct that notwithstanding the jury drtrrmines a confession 
to be false, it remains evidence to be considered under instruc-
tions to be given subsequently concerning false statements 
made by an accused, where a subsequent instruetion co1Teetly 
explains the evidentiary value of false statements, ample evi-
dence of guilt apart from the confessions appears, defendant's 
declarations may have been true in part, and statements as-
sertedly made by him were to some extent self-contradictory. 
[10] Id.-Instructions-Confessions.-Instructions are not sub,iect 
to attack as erroneously assuming that defc>udant conf(•ssed, 
where the jury were in effect told to determine whether a con-
fession was made, and whether, if made, it was voluntary. 
[11] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Confessions.--
Defendant is not prejudiced by failure to instruct the jury spe-
cifically that they should consider his mental condition when 
he made purported confessions, where the subject wa~ adP-
quately covered by instructions, including one requiring the 
jury to consider all the circumstances connected with the 
making of the confessions in determining whether they were 
true. 
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions--Confessions.-
Failure to instruct specifically that any doubt as to the volun-
tariness of a confession was to he resolved in favor of defend-
ant does not prejudice him, where given instructions correetly 
explain the burden of proof and the doetrine of reasonable 
doubt, and where it cannot reasonably be concluded that a 
different verdict would have resulted had the omitted instruc-
tion been given. 
[13] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions-Effect of Con-
sidering as a Whole.-Notwithstanding certain parts of instruc-
tions in a criminal case standing alone may seem to assume 
that a certain count was established as a matter of law, the 
instructions are not subject to attack on such ground, where 
the jury are instructed to consider them as a whole, and where, 
so considered, it does not appear that the jury could han~ 
been misled into believing that the court considered the eount 
to be so established. 
[14] Id.-Instructions-Specific Intent.-It is not rPasonahly prob-
able that the jury was caused to misunderstand an adequate 
instruction on specific intent by the giving of general instruP.-
tions that a criminal intent is established by showing an intent 
to do an aet which, if committed, will constitute a crime, and 
that the intent with which an act is done is manifested hy the 
circumstances attending it, the manner in which it is done, 
the means used and the sound mind and discretion of the actor. 
Dec. 1951] PEOPLE v. CHESSMAN 
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ri5] Sodomy- Evidence--Accomplice Testimony--Corroboration. 
-There is no requirement of corroboration of testimony of 
female witnesses who, when they acted in violation of Pen. 
Code, § 288a, relating to sex perversions, did so m fear of 
their lives and hence were not accomplices. 
(16) Id.-Instructions.-An instruction that there is no require-
ment of corroboration of the testimony of witnesses who vio-
lated Pen. Code, § 288a, not as accomplices but in fear of their 
lives, is not equivalent to a direction to the jury to convict 
the defendant of crimes charged, including those requiring a 
specific intent, if the jury believed that defendant committed 
the overt acts to which the prosecuting· witnesses testified, 
thereby permitting conviction without proof of specific intent. 
[17] Criminal Law--Instructions-Evidence-Flight.-An instruc-
tion as to evidence of flight required by Pen. Code, § 1127c, 
where such evidence is relied on as showing guilt, need not be 
in the precise words of the section. 
[18] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-An instruction 
telling the jury to disregard instructions applying to facts 
found not to exist is not prejudicially erroneous as permitting 
the jury to disregard any other instruction if they concluded 
that such instructions did not apply to the facts whether the 
facts were legally proved or were merely the jurors' opinion. 
[19] Kidnaping-Infliction of Bodily Harm.-Both forcible rape 
and compelling a violation of Pen. Code, § 288a, constitute the 
infliction of bodily harm within § 209, relating to punishment 
for kidnaping. 
[20] !d.-Review-Questions of Law and Fact.-It is for the trier 
of fact rather than an appellate tribunal to determine whether 
a male defendant who engaged in a course of conduct toward 
a female which included robbery and attempted robbery, as-
portation of the victim and commission of sex crimes, ceased 
to be a robber at some time during the abduction and became 
a kidnaper whose sole purpose was to inflict bodily harm by 
forcibly committing sex crimes. 
(21] Robbery-Intent.-The words "This is a stick-up" normally 
imply an intent to rob. 
[22] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact.-It is for the trier of fact 
to determine whether the words "This is a stick-up," when 
considered in their context, show an intent to commit sex 
crimes rather than to rob. 
[23] Criminal Law- Evidence- Inferences.- An inference may 
properly be based on another inference which is not too remote 
or conjectural. 
[15] See 23 Cal.Jur. 400; 48 Am.Jur. 552. 
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[24] Robbery-Evidence.-A robbery conviction is sustained by 
evidence that defendant, displaying a .45 automatic, ordered 
a victim to surrender money, and that the victim against his 
will did so. 
[25] !d.-Evidence-Identity of Accused.-A robbery conviction 
is sustained notwithstanding defendant is not positively iden-
tified, where he confesses to the crime, and where the crime 
was committed in a manner strikingly similar to that of other 
crimes in the commission of which he was positively identified. 
[26] Id.- Attempted Robbery- Evidence. -A conviction of at-
tempted robbery is sustained by evidence that defendant ap-
proached an occupied parked automobile, pushed a .45 auto-
matic through the door and said "This is a stick-up." 
[27] Criminal Law-Instructions-Lesser Offenses-Necessity for 
Request.-A defendant convicted of grand theft of an automo-
bile may not, for the first time on appeal, assert that the court 
should have instructed on the lesser offense, described in Veh. 
Code, § 503, of taking an automobile without the owner's con-
sent, particularly where it does not appear that defendant re-
turned or intended to return the automobile to its owner. 
[28a, 28b] Id.- Argument of Counsel- Number of Counsel.-Al-
though Pen. Code, § 1095, permits two counsel on each side to 
argue in a prosecution for commission of a crime punishable 
by death, the court did not err to defendant's prejudice in 
refusing to permit both defendant and an attorney to argue 
defendant's cause to the jury, where, notwithstanding de-
fendant has the aid of such attorney at the trial, such at-
torney acts as "legal adviser" only and not as counsel, and 
where defendant failed to object at the trial to the ruling. 
[29] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Arguing Law.-It is for the court 
to decide questions of law and although it may permit counsel 
in argument to state correct law, and to discuss the application 
of the law to the facts, it may also refuse him permission to 
argue law. 
[30] !d.-Jury-Instructions After Submission of Case.-It is not 
error for the court to discuss with the jury the meaning of 
"life imprisonment without possibility of parole," and to per-
mit the prosecutor to argue that the phrase overlooks the 
possibility of pardon, commutation and legislative change in 
the penalty, where the court's remarks were in answer to a 
juror's question, which, although propounded after the prose-
cutor's argument, apparently arose after the jury had deter-
mined that a charged kidnaping carne within Pen. Code, § 209, 
and while they were in the process of fixing the penalty. 
[3la, 3lb] Kidnaping- Effect of Amendment of Statute.- The 
1951 amendment of Pen. Code, § 209, making a detention of 
[29] See 8 Cal.Jur. 270; 53 Am.Jur. 399. 
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the victim during an armed robbery no longer punishable under 
the section, does not require reversal or modification of death 
sentences, where the offenses for which the penalties were im-
posed were not mere armed robberies but kidnapings with in-
tent to inflict bodily harm which remain punishable by death. 
[32] Id.-Elements.-It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible 
removal which constitutes kidnaping. 
[33] Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy.-The doctrine of double 
jeopardy has no application to a defendant who is tried bu,t 
once on several counts. 
[34] !d.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Punishing a 
defendant separately for violations of Pen. Code, § 209, relat-
ing to kidnaping, and for robberies and sex crimes which are 
essential parts of the violations would amount to double pun-
ishment forbidden by Pen. Code, § 654. 
[35] Id.-Appeal-Reversal.-Where a defendant is subject to two 
validly imposed death sentences, invalid judgments of convic-
tion rendered in the same prosecution will not be reversed. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County 
and from an order denying a new trial. Charles W. Fricke, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for first degree robbery, grand theft, kidnaping 
for purpose of robbery, and other offenses. Judgments of con-
viction, affirmed. 
Caryl Chessman, in pro. per., for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Frank Richards, 
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney 
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan, Robert Wheeler and J. Miller 
Leavy, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent. 
SCHAUER, J.-Defendant appeals from judgments of 
conviction of 17 felonies, rendered pursuant to jury verdicts, 
and from an order denying his motion for new trial. For 
convenience of discussion the crimes are listed in chrono-
logical order and numbered. Each paragraph indicates a 
separate general criminal enterprise, in each of which one or 
more offenses were committed. 
January 3, 1948: (1) ]'irst degree robbery of Mc-
Cullough. 
January 13, 1948: (2) Grand theft of an automobile, 
which was used in perpetrating subsequent crimes and in 
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which defendant was fleeing· vvhen he was apprehended. 
January 18, 1948: (3) First degree robbery of Bartle. 
January 18, 1948: ( 4) :F'irst degree robbery of Ballew. 
January 19, 1948: (5) First degree robbery of Lea. 
( 6) First degree robbery of Regina. ( 7) Kidnaping Re-
gina for the purpose of robbery, with infliction of bodily 
harm; punishment fixed at death. ( 8) Violation of section 
288a of the Penal Code, committed against Regina. 
January 20, 1948: (9) First degree robbery of Stone. 
January 22, 1948: (10) Attempted robbery of Hurlburt. 
(11) Kidnaping Mary for the purpose of robbery, with in-
fliction of bodily harm; punishment :fixed at death. (12) At-
tempted rape of Mary. (13) Violation of section 288a of the 
Penal Code committed against Mary. 
January 23, 1948: (14) First degree robbery of Waisier. 
(15) First degree robbery of I;esher. (16) Kidnaping 
vVaisler for the purpose of robbery, with infliction of bodily 
harm; punishment fixed at life imprisonment witl1out pos-
sibility of parole. ( 17) Kidnaping I1esher for the purpose 
of robbery. 
'l'he jury further found that defendant was armed at the 
time of the commission of each of the crimes except that of 
grand theft, numbered (2) above; that he was armed at the 
time of his arrest; and that he had suffered two previous con-
victions of robbery and one of assault with a deadly weapon. 
Defendant was acquitted of one count of burglary. We have 
concluded that no prejudicial error is shown and that the 
judgments and order should be affirmed. 
Sufficiency of Transcript 
Defendant argues questions as to the correctness and valid-
ity of the reporter's transcript which were finally decided 
against him by this court in People v. Chessman (1950), 35 
Cal.2d 455 [218 P.2d 769, 19 A.L.R.2d 1084]. Reexamination 
of these arguments and of the transcript leaves us convinced 
that the transcript permits a fair consideration and disposi-
tion of the appeal. 
Denial of Continuance to Enable Defendant to Obta·in Coun-
sel., or to Interview and Subpena Witnesses ancl Prepare 
IIis Case in P1·opria Persona 
Defendant eomplains that he was fUl·eed to go to trial un-
prepared. The situation on whieh this claim is based resulted 
from the fact that he insisted upon representing himself. 
The informations against defendant (numbered 117963 and 
Dec. 1951] PEOPLE v. CHESSMAN 
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117964) were filed on February 18, 1948. On February 20, 
1948, defendant, represented by private counsel Morris La-
vine, was arraigned and the causes were continued to :B'ebru-
ary 27. On February 27 amended informations were filed 
and the causes continued to March 5. On March 5, defendant, 
l"epresented by private counsel V. L. Ferguson, appeared and 
was arraigned on amended informations; time to plead was 
continued to March 9. On March 9 defendant and Mr. Fer-
guson appeared and Mr. Ferguson was relieved as counsel. 
Defendant now asserts: ''one of those counsel wanted mor(l 
money than appellant believed his services were worth and 
appellant and his father could not agree with the other coun-
sel as to the conduct of the defense, so both were relieved and 
appellant determined to represent himself." 
On March 12, 1948, defendant appeared without counsel. 
'!'he public defender was present and announced, ''We have 
been relieved, your Honor." Defendant stated that he wished 
to represent himself. .After a colloquy with the court during 
which defendant repeated his insistence on representing 
himself, the court said, "-What will probably happen, if we 
set this case down for trial, you will want a lawyer and then 
ask for a continuance. If you want to try your own case, 
there is no way we can tell you not to. You will have to try 
it or have somebody hired to represent you in plenty of time 
to try the case at the time it is set. THE DEFENDANT CHESS-
MAN: I understand that. THE CoUR'l' :. Because many times 
men with past experiences such as you have had-you know 
the tricks of the trade, and they get a lawyer at the very last 
minute. You really want to try your own case~ THE DE-
F"ENDANT CHESSMAN : That is correct.'' Defendant pleaded 
not guilty; the court set April 26 and 29 as the dates for 
trial on the respective informations and again explained to 
defendant that no continuance based on his decision to repre-
sent himself would be gTanted. "Some time during the mid-
dle of March'' Mr . .Al Matthews, deputy public defender, 
called on defendant at the county jail and offered his services; 
defendant rcfu,_<:ed them. On .April 26 all charges against 
defendant were continued to .April 29 for trial. On April 29 
defendant appeared without counsel, moved for another con-
tinuance, and complained that because of his confinement 
in the county jail he had been unable to obtain lawbooks 
and interview witnesses. The trial court explained to him 
that his decision to represent himself did not entitle him to 
greater privileges than other prisoners; defendant again re-
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peatedly refused the offer of counsel; and a continuance was 
denied. 
Defendant summarizes the trial court's position as follows : 
''That the calendar judge in assigning the case for trial had 
warned the defendant that he must be ready and that he 
would be allowed no continuance. That the trial court offered 
to appoint counsel who could have prepared a defense for the 
defendant. That because the defendant refused the appoint-
ment of counsel it was the defendant's own fault that he was 
not prepared, that he could not consequently complain of his 
lack of preparation, that the sheriff's regulations [of the 
privileges accorded prisoners in the county jail] could not 
be interfered with by the court, and that, therefore, the de-
fendant must go to trial, prepared or not.'' This is a fair 
summary of the court's position; that position appears cor-
rect; and defendant cites no authority to the contrary. 
[l] Defendant argues that the denial of a continuance 
deprived him of the right to select counsel of his choice and 
deprived such counsel of the opportunity to prepare. The 
answer to this contention is factual and appears from the 
above summarized history of the proceedings prior to trial. 
Defendant was entitled to waive assistance of counsel, and it 
is clear that he did so of his own volition and with full knowl-
edge of what he was doing (Adams v. United States ex rel. 
McCann (1942), 317 U.S. 269, 279 [63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 
268, 143 .A.L.R. 435] ; cf. People v. Chesser ( 194 7), 29 Cal.2d 
815, 822 [178 P.2d 761] ). 
[2] Furthermore, defendant did not go to trial without 
the services of an attorney at law. Immediately before the 
jury were impaneled, defendant announced to the court 
that he intended to accept the services of Mr. Matthews as 
legal adviser (not counsel) and throughout the trial Mr. 
Matthews was present and his legal ability and experience 
were available to defendant. These circumstances will be 
material to our disposition of certain contentions of defend-
ant hereinafter discussed, and it will be necessary for us to 
refer again to the following proposition: .A defendant who 
intelligently refuses counsel and insists upon personally 
conducting and controlling his defense does not lose the 
status of prisoner and become entitled to extraordinary 
privileges not accorded defendants who are represented by 
counsel, nor does he become entitled to proceed in a manner 
different from that permitted to attorneys. 
Dec.1951] PEOPLE v. CHESSMAN 
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[3] Defendant contends that the trial court erred to his 
prejudice by consolidating for trial the crimes charged in In-
formation 117963 with the crimes charged in Information 
117964. This type of objection cannot be urged for the first 
time on appeal. (People v. Pearson (1940), 41 Cal.App.2d 
614, 619 [107 P.2d 463]; People v. Johns (1945), 69 Cal.App. 
2d737, 740 [160 P.2d102]; People v. Beck (1945), 71 Cal.App. 
2d 637, 641 [163 P.2d 41].) 
Defendant asserts that he objected to the consolidation in 
the trial court but the record1 shows that he did not. Origi-
nally the case of Information 117963, by which defendant and 
David Knowles were jointly charged with crimes described 
in People v. Knowles (1950), 35 Cal.2d 175 [217 P.2d 1] 
(grand theft of an automobile, above numbered (2), and two 
robberies and two kidnapings, above numbered (14) through 
(17) ) , was set for trial on April 26, 1948; the case of In-
formation 117964, which charged defendant alone with the 
remaining crimes of which he has been convicted, was set for 
trial on April 29. When the first group of charges came on 
for trial defendant's motions for a trial separate from that 
of Knowles and a continuance were granted. All charges 
against defendant came on for trial on April 29. At this 
time the court ordered the cases against defendant consoli-
dated for trial. Defendant asked "that these cases be re-
turned to the Master Calendar court for reassignment'' and 
stated at length his reasons for this request, but he did not 
suggest that the cases should not have been consolidated. 
Motion for Change of Venue 
Immediately before the jury were impaneled, Mr. Matthews 
stated to the court that defendant wished to move for change 
of venue, on grounds unknown to Matthews, and that he 
could have the application prepared later in the day. The 
trial court told defendant to state orally the grounds on which 
he sought change of venue. Defendant stated that he could 
not obtain a fair trial in the county because a prejudicial 
article about him had appeared in a local publication, and 
because the district attorney planned to prosecute another 
person for crimes which were similar to some of those charged 
'The pertinent portion of the transcript was prepared by the original 
reporter and defendant does not challenge its accuracy. 
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against defendant and which had been committed at times 
when defendant was in prison. The court ruled, "The motion 
will be denied. '' 
[4] Defendant complains that he was not given oppor-
tunity to present a written, verified application as required 
by section 1034 of the Penal Code. There is no indication 
that the denial of the motion was on the ground that it was 
not in proper form. Defendant had had ample time to pre-
pare a proper application, and the motion came too late and 
should have been denied even if it had been in writing. 
Furthermore, the trial court was well within its discretion 
in denying the motion on the merits. 
Req~~irernent That Defendant Remain at Co1lnsel Table 
[5] During voir dire examination of the prospective 
jurors defendant was not allowed to approach the jury box 
and during the trial he was not allowed to approach witnesses 
on the stand. Defendant urges that he was hampered in the 
presentation of his ease and unfairly discriminated against, 
since the prosecuting attorney moved about the courtroom 
~nd dramatically approached witnesses and jury, whereas 
defendant, in violation of section 688 of the Penal Code, 
was subjected to "more restraint than ... [was] necessary 
for his detention to answer the charge.'' The trial court's 
ruling was within its discretion. Defendant, whether or 
not he was guilty of the crimes charged in this proceeding, 
was a defendant on trial for these charges. In representing 
himself he retained this status and did not attain that of an 
attorney at law who is an officer of the court and responsible 
to it. Furthermore, the defendant had suffered previous 
convictions of crimes of violence. Neither the presumption 
of innocence as a rule of proof in relation to the crimes 
charged nor the elements of a fair trial under due process 
required the court to conduct the trial proceedings oblivious 
to the facts mentioned. Considerations for the safety and 
security of all persons present in the courtroom, including 
the defendant, and for the judicial process itself, justified the 
trial judge in feeling that it was unwise to allow defendant 
to wander freely about the courtroom. 
Den'ial of Defendant's Motion fat' Daily Transcript 
[6] Although the trial judge knew that the trial would be 
long, the factual issues numerous, and the death penalty 
would be sought, he denied defendant's motion for a daily 
Dec. 1951] PEOPLE v. CHESSMAN 
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transcript. The prosecuting attorney did not request or 
receive a daily transcript but he did obtain, apparently with-
out court order, transcription of certain portions of the trial 
which he used in his argument to the jury. The reason for 
this seeming discrimination does not appear. But' neither 
does it appear that defendant was prejudicialJy handicapped 
by want of a daily transcript. He presented his case and de-
livered his argument without any indication of confusion 
or uncertainty; accordingly, no miscarriage of justice on this 
account is established. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 4Jf2.) 
111isconduct of Prosecuting Attorney Not Controlled 
by the Trial Court 
[7] Regrettably, the prosecuting attorney presented his 
case in an overzealous manner, both in addressing the jury2 
and in improperly bringing in evidence of misconduct of de-
fendant for which he was not on triaP But the improprieties 
of the prosecuting attorney could have been corrected had 
there been objection thereto in the trial court. Defendant 
now complains that the trial court of its own motion should 
have interposed objections and, in effect, undertaken defend-
2The prosecuting attorney on voir dire examination of the prospective 
jurors said, ''I do not believe the evidence will show that the defendant 
has murdered or killed anyone yet.'' On the voir dire examination 
and in argument he emphasized his belief that defendant should receive 
the death penalty. He commented that defendant was representing 
himself in order to gain the sympathy of the jury. 
The prosecuting attorney in argument was summarizing evidence of 
one of the robberies when a juror asked, "Isn't that grand theft when 
it is over $500?" He replied, "It is true, Mrs. Vamos, that I could 
from the penal code give you at least a half dozen particular crimes that 
I know he has committed that he is not charged with here .... You 
are correct. It is grand theft, because the amount taken was over 
$500. But robbery is a different character of crime than grand theft, 
although we could charge him, we just didn't do it .... It is a viola-
tion of the deadly weapons act for . . . a man who has been previously 
convicted of a felony, to . . . have in their possession this gun. He is 
not charged with it. It is just one of the other things. I can think of 
some other crimes which he has committed such as assault with a deadly 
weapon. We did not charge it. I would have to stop some place or 
we would be talking here all day. I do not want to do that. Don't let 
those things bother you too much.'' 
"Officer Forbes, who gave proper evidence of admissions and con-
fessions made by defendant, was also permitted, without objection, 
to testify to statements of defendant which disclosed what defendant 
now aptly characterizes as his ''self-admitted violent criminal past and 
present dangerous, antisocial state of mind.'' These later statements 
were introduced by the prosecution under the guise of impeaching de-
fendant's testimony as to the context of his conversations with Forbes. 
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ant's representation. But defendant deliberately (and not 
naively) determined to represent himself; part of the tech-
nique of his representation appears to have been the studied 
omission to interpose objections, the frank admission that 
he was a criminal, and the argument that the crimes charged 
were committed by a blundering person rather than a clever 
professional such as the eyidence indicates he was; he fol-
lowed this technique while requiring a skilled defense at-
torney to sit silently at his side. We are not disposed to 
permit a defendant who thus develops a record to claim 
prejudice from it, although the cumulative instances of mis-
conduct might in other circumstances constitute ground for 
reversal. It is because of defendant's purposeful and in-
formed failure to have this case tried in a different fashion 
that such cases as People v. Orcalles (1948), 32 Cal.2d 562, 
572 [ 197 P .2d 26] ; People v. Hardy ( 1948), 33 Cal.2d 52, 
62 [198 P.2d 865] ; and People v. Lynch (1943), 60 Cal.App. 
2d 133, 143 [140 P.2d 418], are not controlling here. 
Admissibility of Confessions 
Defendant urges that the admission in evidence of assert-
edly coerced confessions was not merely error but deprived 
him of due process. The evidence as to the circumstances 
under which the confessions were obtained was in conflict as 
to whether defendant was beaten by the police but, defendant 
urges, there is sufficient uncontradicted evidence to overcome, 
as a matter of law, the People's prima facie showing that 
the confessions were voluntary. The evidence in this respect 
is as follows : 
On Friday evening, January 23, 1948, police officers in a 
patrol car observed an automobile which corresponded to the 
description of the one which had been used in certain of the 
crimes here charged. When the officers turned on their red 
spotlight the car, which was driven by defendant, fled. There 
was a lengthy chase, first in the automobiles, then on foot. 
Defendant was captured and handcuffed after a struggle. 
He was taken to the Hollywood police station and held there 
until Monday evening, January 26, 1948, when he was taken 
to the Los Angeles county jail. 
On the night of January 23 defendant was questioned by 
police officers from about 8 :30 to 10 :30. On the morning 
of January 24 Officer Forbes commenced to question defend-
ant at about 8 o'clock. Defendant first denied participa-
tion in any of the crimes here concerned. Forbes told defend-
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ant, "you can't beat us on this particular job" (the crimes 
committed with Knowles), and pointed out that defendant 
had been driving a stolen car which contained loot from 
those crimes; defendant then confessed those crimes. Forbes 
and other officers continued the interrogation, particularly 
concerning the sex crimes. The officers testified that they 
made no promise of reward or inducement. Defendant as-
serts that he confessed to the sex crimes only after the officers 
said they would charge him solely with robbery. 
On January 24 defendant was taken to the home of a vic-
tim of some of the crimes. She identified him. Defendant 
testified that during this trip the officers' conduct made it 
clear to him that they hoped he would attempt to escape. 
That this conduct was for the purpose of putting defendant in 
fear, he argues, is shown by the testimQny of one of the 
officers who accompanied defendant that he had another officer 
"tail us in case anything happened in our car." 
The asserted confessions of the sex crimes were made on the 
afternoon of January 24, after defendant had talked to a 
police psychiatrist with whom he refused to discuss such 
crimes .. Defendant argues that it is inherently improbable 
that he would refuse to discuss the matter with the psychi-
atrist and would shortly thereafter voluntarily confess the 
crimes to the police. 
Officer Forbes, one of the officers who questioned defendant, 
testified that a bulletin to the eifect that defendant had con-
fessed to the sex crimes was sent on the police teletype at 9 :15 
a. m. on January 24, although defendant did not confess 
until after 3 o'clock of that afternoon. This premature re-
lease of the bulletin (assuming Officer Forbes' statement of 
the time of release to be correct), says defendant, shows that 
the officer anticipated that, although a voluntary confession 
was not forthcoming, a confession would in some manner be 
obtained. 
Officer Forbes testified that it was usual police practice to 
have a defendant who admitted his guilt sign a written con-
fession but that he did not request defendant to do so because 
"I thought it would be useless" and that he made no written 
notes while talking with defendant because ''Some suspects 
will relate it and let you write it down as you take it; other 
suspects wouldn't tell you anything if they know you are 
taking notes.'' Yet another police officer who, with Forbes, 
questioned defendant testified that he made a list of crimes 
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(not the crimes cbarge0 here) to which defendant confessed 
and that he wrote the list in defendant's and Forbes' pres-
ence after defendant said, "Get your pencil and paper." 
This contrasting testimony, says defendant, shows that his 
confessions to the crimes charged were not free. 
Further showing that his mentality was not free when he 
confessed, says defendant, is Forbes' testimony that '' [W] hen 
we were thumbing through the crime sheets, anything that 
we thought might fit the description of Chessman, he would 
say, ' ... If you want to clear your books just mark them 
off. I'll take credit for them.' '' 
[8] The above recited arguments of defendant as to the 
asserted involuntariness of his confessions relate to conflicting 
inferences of fact which could be drawn from the testimony. 
Those inferences were tentatively drawn against defendant 
by the trial judge when he admitted the confessions in evi-
dence and, presumptively, were finally drawn against defend-
ant by the jury in the light of all the evidence. This is not a 
case where the confessions are shown, on the face of the rec-
ord, to have been given in circumstances inherently coercive. 
Instructions as to False Confession 
[9] The jury were instructed that ''If under my instruc-
tions you find that a voluntary confession was made, you are 
the exclusive judges as to whether or not the confession was 
true; and in deciding that question you should consider all 
the circumstances connected with the making of the statement, 
as shown by the evidence. But even if you should find that a 
confession was false, e·ither entirely or in part, it remains, 
nevertheless evidence for your consider·ation, to be given 
such significance as your judgment may determine 1tnder in-
structions that I shortly shall give concerning false statements 
made by a person accused of crime." (Italics added.) 'l'he 
italicized portion of this instruction was held ground for re-
versal in People v. Ford (1948), 89 Cal.App.2d 467, 473 [200 
P .2d 867], on the ground that "If the jury had believed that 
defendant lied to the officers when he admitted the theft, 
he should have been acquitted. How they could have started 
with the premise that he was innocent and ended with a con-
clusion that he was guilty because he had lied to the officers is 
something we are unable to comprehend. But if this could 
not have been done the instruction was confusing and im-
possible of rational application to the evidence." In the 
Ford case, however, "there was only slight circumstantial 
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evidence of defendant's guilt aside from the confession'' 
(p. 471 of 89 Cal.App. 2d) and the trial court gave no ex-
planatory instructions concerning false statements by one 
accused of crime. Here there is ample evidence of guilt apart 
from the confessions; the declarations of the defendant in 
making the confessions may have been in part true and in 
part false ; the statements assertedly ma.de by defendant, as 
related above, were to some extent self-contradictory; and 
the following instruction correctly explaining the possible 
evidentiary value or immateriality. of false statements was 
given : ''If you should :find from the evidence that there was 
an occasion when the defendant, under conditions which 
fairly afforded him an opportunity to reply, ... made false, 
evasive or contradictory statements, in the face of an accusa-
tion, expressed directly to him or in his presence, charging 
him with the crime for which he now is on trial or tending 
to connect him with its commission, and if you should :find 
that he heard the accusation and understood its nature, ... 
his ... conduct may be considered against him as indi-
cating an admission that the accusation thus made was true. 
Evidence of such an accusatory statement is not received for 
the purpose of proving its truth, but only to explain the con-
duct of the accused in the face of it; and unless you should 
find that his conduct at the time indicated an admission that 
the accusatory statement was true, you should entirely dis-
regard the statement." (See, also, People v. Woods (1950), 
35 Cal.2d 504, 510 [218 P.2d 981], and People v. Liss (1950), 
3fi Cal.2d 570, 574 [219 P.2d 789], pointing out the dangers 
of an instruction such as the italicized portion of the in-
struction quoted on p. 180, supra, but holding such instruc-
tion not reversible error in the circumstances.) 
Contention that the Instructions Took From the Jury the 
Ques#on Whether a Confession Was in Ifact Made 
[10] Defendant contends that the instructions assume 
that defendant in fact confessed. The instruction quoted 
supra, p. 180, commences, ''If under my instructions you 
find that a voluntary confession was made . . . , '' and the 
jury elsewhere were told that they "must disregard the as-
serted confession entirely unless you ... conclude that the 
alleged confession not only was made, but was voluntary.'' 
Thus it was made clear to the jury that the question whether 
a confession was made, as well as its character as voluntary 
or involuntary, if made at all, was :for them to determine. 
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Omission to Instruct that Jury Sho~tld Consider Defendant's 
Mental Condition at the Time He Made Any Confession 
[11] Defendant contends that the trial court should have 
instructed the jury that, in determining the weight and effect 
of any confessions, they should consider the question of de-
fendant's mental condition at the time of such confessions. 
In the light of the entire record the subject was adequately 
covered by the instructions, which include the specific di-
rection that the jury, in deciding whether the confessions 
were true, ''should consider all the circumstances connected 
with the making of the statement, as shown by the evidence.'' 
Omission to Instruct that if the Jury Had a Reasonable 
Doubt as to Whether· any Confession Was Voluntary, 
They Should Resolve Such Doubt In Favor of Defendant 
[12] The trial court rejected defendant's requested in-
struction to the above effect. The refusal of the instruction, 
says defendant, improperly placed on him the burden of 
proving that the confessions were involuntary and was con-
trary to the general statement, quoted in People v. Ralph 
(1944), 24 Cal.2d 575, 581 [150 P.2d 401], that "the defend-
ant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, 
whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true 
interpretation of words or the construction of language used 
in a statute.'' The requested instruction correctly state:; 
the law and might well have been given but, on the other 
hand, the jury were fully and correctly instructed as to the 
burden of proof and the doctrine of ''reasonable doubt'' as 
governing all issues of fact, and it cannot be reasonably con-
cluded that the failure to give this particular instruction, 
spe~ifically applying the general principles which were ex-
plained, resulted in a verdict different from that which would 
have been reached if the instruction had been given. 
Contention that the Instructions Assume that Defendant 
Committed Kidnaping for the Purpose of Robbery 
[13] As to the counts which charge kidnaping for the 
purpose of robbery the court instructed the jury that "it will 
be your duty to determine whether the person or persons 
subjected to such kidnaping suffered bodily harm.'' These 
instructions, defendant urges, improperly assume and inform 
the jury that kidnaping for the purpose of robbery was es-
tablished as a matter of law. If we were to consider the 
isolated portions of the instructions just quoted, they would 
be subject to this criticism. But, considering the instructions 
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as a whole-and the jury were told to so consider them-
it does not appear that they could lead the jury to believe 
that the court was of the opinion, or intimated an opinion, 
that the crimes of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery had 
been established. 
Claimed Inadequacy of Instructions as to Specific Intent 
[14] Defendant urges that the trial court, of its own motion, 
should have given more detailed instructions as to the specific 
intent to commit robbery which is an essential element of the 
crime of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. The follow-
ing adequate instructions were given: ''In the case of cer-
tain crimes it is necessary that in addition to the intended 
act which characterizes the offense, the act must be accom-
panied by a specific or particular intent without which such 
a crime may not be committed ... 
"[I]n the crime of Kidnapping for the Purpose of Robbery, 
a necessary element is the existence in the mind of the perpe-
trator of the specific intent to commit robbery and unless 
such intent so exists that crime is not committed, but 
"No actual robbery need be committed, as the Kidnapping 
is complete once the individual is seized for the purpose of 
robbery." 
Defendant, relying upon People v. Snyder (1940), 15 Cal. 
2d 706, 708 [104 P.2d 639], urges that the instructions were 
insufficient because the jury were also instructed generally 
that ''To constitute criminal intent it is merely necessary 
that a person intend to do an act which, if committed, will 
constitute a crime,'' and that ''The intent with which an 
act is done is manifested by the circumstances attending 
the act, the manner in which it is done, the means used, and 
the sound mind and discretion of the person committing the 
act.'' It is not reasonably probable that the latter instruc-
tions caused the jury to misunderstand the instruction as to 
the specific intent to rob. The Snyder case, which concerned 
materially different instructions and a materially different 
crime, does not apply here. 
[15, 16] The trial judge instructed the jury that in prose-
cution for the various crimes here charged corroboration of 
the prosecuting witnesses was not required. This instruction 
was correct. The undisputed evidence shows that the fe-
male victims were not accomplices, but were act~ng in fear 
of their lives, in the violations of section 288a ; therefore, 
corroboration of their testimony was not required. (People v. 
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Featherstone (1945), 67 Cal.App.2d 793,796 [155 P.2d 685].) 
But, defendant argues, the instruction that corroboration was 
not required was equivalent to a direction to convict of the 
crimes charged, including those requiring specific intent, if 
the jury believed that defendant committed the overt acts to 
which the prosecuting witnesses testified; therefore, he says, 
the instruction permitted conviction without proof of specific 
intent. On no rational view of the instruction, either in or 
out of its context, could it have the meaning attributed to it 
by defendant. 
Instruction as to Flight 
[17] Section 1127 c of the Penal Code provides that, 
where evidence of flight is relied upon, the court shall in-
struct the jury substantially in language there set. out. The 
trial court did so. Defendant argues that slight variations 
between the language of the statutory instruction and the 
language of the instruction here given are significant. This 
argument is elaborate but insubstantial. 
Instnwtion that Jury Disregard Instructions which Apply 
to Facts which They Find Do not Exist 
[18] The court told the jury that ''The applicability of 
some of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions 
you reach as to what the facts are. As to any such instruc-
tion, the fact that it has been g·iven must not be taken as in-
dicating an opinion of the court that the instruction will be 
necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction ap-
plies only to a state of facts which you find does not exist, 
you will disregard the instruction. '' 
Defendant relies upon People v Bodey (1928), 94 Cal.App. 
420, 423 [271 P. 203], where it is said that a similar instruc-
tion should not have been given; that it was confusing but 
not reversible error. It is defendant's position that under 
this instruction the jury could disregard any of the other in-
structions if they concluded that such instructions did not 
apply to the facts, whether such facts were legally proven 
or were the mere opinion of the jurors. 
It does not appear that the instruction complained of is 
susceptible to an interpretation which would make it preju-
dicially erroneous. In People v. Casey (1926), 79 Cal.App. 
295, 302 [249 P. 525], it was said of a similar instruction that 
"Although more apt language might well have been used, 
it appears that the meaning intended to be conveyed was 
merely this : That while certain rules of law had been stated, 
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the court did not wish to be understood as expressing any 
opinion upon matters of fact. It is obvious that whether or 
not legal principles announced are applicable to the facts 
of a particular case will often depend upon the jury's inter-
pretation of the evidence." (See, also, People v. Palmer 
(1946), 76 Cal.App.2d 679,686 [173 P.2d 680].) 
Attempted Ra1Je and Forcing Victim to V1:olate Section /288a 
of the Penal Code as Infliietion of Bodily Harm 
[19] Bodily harm under section 209 of the Penal Code is 
defined in People v. Tamner ( 1935), 3 Cal.2d 279, 297 [ 44 
P.2d 324]: "Bo&ily hm·m is g·enerally defined as 'any touch-
ing of the person of another against his will with physical 
force in an intentional, hostile and aggravated manner, or 
projecting of sueh force against his person.' '' The trial eourt 
so instructed the jmy; it further instructed them that both 
attempted forcible rape and compelling a violation of sec-
tion 288a are "bodily harm." 
Statements in People v. Mcilvain (1942), 55 CaLApp.2d 
322, 332 [130 P.2d 131], which tend to support defendant's 
argument that the commission of the sex crimes by threat of 
force did not amount to the infliction of bodily harm were 
disapproved in People v. B1"0Wn (1947), 29 Cal.2d 555, 560 
r176 P.2d 929]. In the Brown case we reiterated the defini-
tion of bodily harm as quoted above from the Tanner case 
and declared that "The forcible rape itself was bodily harm." 
We note that the facts of the Brown case differ from those of 
defendant's case in that Brown actually struck his victim as 
well as raping her, but we hold that the rule of the Brown 
case is equally applicable here. It would belie sensibility 
and defame the mores of our age to hold that such treatment 
as the female vietinu:; received here is not the infliction of 
''bodily harm'' within the meaning of section 209 of the 
Penal Code. 
Defendant's Contention that the Evidence Does Not S1tpport 
the Detenninatio11 that Crimes (8) and (11), J{,idnap-
?·ngs, Were for the Purpose of Robbery 
[20] On January 19, 1948, defendant stopped a car 
driven by him near a parked car occupied by I..~ea and Regina. 
He displayed a .45 automatic pistol and during the ensuing 
events repeatedly threatened to kill hiR victims if they did 
not obey his commands. Defendant took Lea's wallet, the 
keys to I..~ea 's car, and Regina's purse. He then forced Re-
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gina to walk 22 feet to the car he was using, to enter the 
car, and to violate section 288a. Another automobile ap-
proached. Defendant took $5.00 from Regina's purse, handed 
her the purse and Lea's keys, permitted her to get out of his 
car, and drove swiftly away. 
On January 22, 1948, defendant approached a parked car 
occupied by Hurlburt and Mary, pushed a .45 automatic 
pistol through the door, and said, ''This is a stick-up.'' Both 
victims replied that they had no money. Defendant then 
forced Mary to enter his car, drove to an isolated place, and 
compelled her to submit to sex crimes. 
Defendant argues that the above summarized evidence at 
the most shows that he first robbed Regina and attempted to 
rob Mary, then abandoned his intent to rob and abducted the 
women with the sole intention of committing sex crimes 
against them. This argument is without merit. A defendant 
who engages in a course of conduct toward a female victim 
which includes robbery or attempted robbery, asportation of 
the victim, and the commission of sex crimes may present 
such argument to the trier of fact. But we cannot say as a 
matter of law that at some point of time during the abductions 
of his female victims defendant ceased to be a robber and be-
came a kidnaper whose sole purpose was to inflict bodily harm 
by forcibly committing sex crimes. (See the following cases 
in which the described series of related criminal transactions 
were held to support a conviction of violation of section 209 
of the Penal Code [kidnaping for the purpose of robbery in 
which the person kidnaped suffered bodily harm] : People v. 
Kristy (1935), 4 Cal.2d 504, 507 [50 P.2d 798] [robbery fol-
lowed by abduction for the primary purpose of escape, during 
which the kidnaped persons suffered bodily harm]; Peo-
ple v. Dugger (1936), 5 Cal.2d 337, 339 [54 P.2d 707] [de-
fendant beat his female victim, dragged her around her house, 
attempted to rape her, and ransacked bureau drawers]; Peo-
ple v. Brown (1947), supm, 29 Cal. 2d 555, 558 [defendant 
abducted a woman, raped her, then took her watch and auto-
mobile; in the language of People v. Knowles (1950), supra, 
35 Cal.2d 175, 185, "the taking of the wristwatch made the 
abduction kidnapping to commit robbery, even if the original 
objective were rape and the intent to rob was only an after-
thought"]; cf. People v. Welsh (1936), 7 Cal.2d 209, 212 [60 
P.2d 124] [forcible abduction and attempted rape; the de-
fendant took a package of cigarettes from the woman's purse 
without taking the money which was in it or disturbing its 
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contents; held, this was not kidnaping for the purpose of 
robbery].) 
[21-23] Defendant urges that the words'' This is a stick-up'' 
do not show an intent to rob. This is their normal implication. 
Defendant's contention that in their context in the crimes 
against Hurlburt and Mary they show an intent to commit 
sex crimes is one of fact which should not be addressed to this 
court. In this connection defendant presents an elaborate 
discussion of the question whether it is permissible to base 
an inference on an inference. As stated in Vaccarezza v. 
Sanguinetti (1945), 71 Cal.App.2d 687, 698 [163 P.2d 470], 
''The statement appearing in some cases that an inference 
cannot be based upon an inference, usually without citation 
and certainly without adequate discussion, does not and can-
not mean that an inference cannot be based upon a fact 
which is itself based upon circumstantial evidence .... The 
true rule is and should be that an inference cannot be based 
on an inference that is too remote or conjectural.'' 
Sufficiency of Evidence of Crimes (1), (9), and (10) 
[24-26] Defendant's arguments in this connection can be 
answered by briefly stating the evidence which he says is in-
sufficient. As to crime ( 1), robbery, the victim testified that 
defendant, displaying a .45 automatic, ordered him to sur-
render money and he, against his will, did so. The victim 
of crime (9), robbery, was unable to identify defendant 
positively; however, the crime was committed in a manner 
strikingly similar to that of other crimes where defendant 
was positively identified; furthermore, defendant confessed 
to this robbery. That the evidence of crime (10), attempted 
robbery, was sufficient appears from our summary thereof in 
connection with the kidnaping of Mary. 
Omission to Instruct as to Section 503 of the Vehicle Code 
(Taking an Automobile Without Owner's Consent) 
[27] As to crime (2), grand theft of an automobile, there 
is ample evidence (the length of time and manner in which 
defendant used the car) to show that he intended to steal it. 
But, defendant says, the evidence would also permit the in-
ference that he took the car with intent merely to deprive 
the owner of possession temporarily; i.e., the lesser offense 
of violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code; and the jury 
should have been so instructed. In support of this contention 
defendant refers to the prosecuting attorney's argument that 
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''There ar<> fellows like Chessman who are scouting around 
looking for a particular kind of ear which they want to 
steal for a few days.'' l f defendant wished to raise this 
contention, he should have requested an instruction as to the 
lesser offense and argued the matter to the jury. Further-
more, it does not appear that defendant returned, or at any 
time intended to return, the car to its owner. 
Asserted Violation of Sect,ion 109!3 of the Penal Code 
[28a] Section 1095 provides, ''If the indictment or infor-
mation be for an offense punishable with death, two counsel 
on each side may argue the cause to the jury.'' After the 
prosecuting attorney eoncluded l1is opening argument the 
trial court of its own motion said, ''So there will be no mis-
umlerstanding I am only going to allow one eounsel to ad-
dress the jury on each side . . . I am not going to permit 
. . . [Mr. Matthews] to argue, and then the defendant." 
'l'his ruling was not literally a violation of section 1095, for 
defendant was not represented by counsel; he had conducted 
his own defense and l\ilr. lVIatthews had acted only as "legal 
adviser," not counsel. 
[29] Defendant contends that the ruling was prejudicial 
error because he wished to argue the facts to the jury but he 
wished Mr. Matthews, an attorney who could do so more ef-
fectively, to argue the law. It is for the court to decide ques-
tions of law and although it may permit counsel in argument 
to state correct law, and to discuss the application of the law 
to the facts, it may also refuse him permission to argue law. 
(See Pen. Code, §§ 1124, 1126, 1127, 1093, par. 6; People v. 
Den01nme (1899), 6 Cal.Unrep. 227, 231 [56 P. 98]; People 
v. T'readwell (1886), 69 Cal. 226, 238 [10 P. 502]; People v. 
Hcmey (1920), 46 Cal.App. 317, 324 [189 P. 338]; and cases 
collected in 7 McKinney's New Cal.Dig., Criminal Law, 
§§ 624, 625.) 
[28b] Furthermore, even if we assume that lVIr. Matthews 
might have argued certain aspects of the facts as related to 
the law more skillfully than defendant, it appears that defend-
ant by his insistence upon conducting his own case and refus-
ing to appear by counsel has put himself in a position where 
he cannot complain of the trial court's ruling. He made no 
objection thereto in the trial court; also, as stated, he was not 
represented by ''counsel'' at all. Unless a party authorizes 
an attorney to represent him he is not entitled to have the 
attorney speak for him. There was no error in refusing to 
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permit the consulting but nonrepresenting attorney to argue 
the case. 
Argument of Prosecnding Attorney and Instructions to Jury 
as to Mean1:ng of Life Irnprisonrnent Without Possibility 
of ParoT/e 
[30] 'l'he prosecuting attorney argued that "punishment 
for life imprisonment without possibility of parole does not 
mean what it says. Those are the words that are used in the 
statute defining the punishment, but that is not what it 
means,'' because of the possibility of pardon, commutation or 
the Legislature's changing the penalty. Furthermore, he re-
peatedly commented that defendant "hasn't much to lose if 
you just convict him of robbery. Robbery doesn't mean a 
thing to him. No. To convict him of robbery is just like you 
going home. Time means nothing to him.'' 
The jury were apparently impressed by this argument, for 
after they had deliberated for a time they returned into court 
and requested instruction as to the meaning of life imprison-
ment without possibility of parole. The trial court said, "that 
primarily means that the person committed to prison under, 
such a sentence will be required to serve life imprisonment 
in prison, and can not be paroled," and explained that a per-
son sente11ced to life imprisonment for murder, for example, 
could be paroled. It went on to say further, however, as the 
prosecuting attorney had in his argument, that there was al-
ways a possibility of commutation, pardon, or a legislative 
change in punishment.4 A juror asked whether, if the punish-
ment of life imprisonment without possibility of parole were 
imposed, "would there be any assurance that that party would 
never be free again?'' and the court again pointed out the 
possibility of action by the governor or the Legislature. 
This insistence of the trial court in emphasizing such possi-
bilitiAs operated to his prejudice, defendant says, and resulted 
in the impmdtion of the death penalty. He relies upon such 
<'ases as People v. Ramos (1935), 3 Cal.2d 269, 272 [44 P.2d 
301], <md People v. LeTournea11 (]949), 34 Cal.2d 478, 494 
[211 P.2d 8651, in support of his contention that the trial 
court should not have discussed the matter with the jury and 
s;hould not have permitted the prosecuting attorney to argue it. 
'rhe statements of which defendant complains relate 
solely to the question of punishment for the crime of kidnap-
4As will appear infra, p. 191, the Legislature since the date of trial 
of this ease, has made such a change in punishment. 
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ing for the purpos~ of robbery where the victim suffers bodily 
harm, a question which is addressed to the discretion of the 
jury. (Pen. Code, § 209.) It is clear from the colloquy be-
tween the jurors and the judge, and from the verdicts subse-
quently arrived at, that it was this question which they were 
considering when they returned to court for further instruc-
tions. They must already have tentatively determined that 
the kidnaping victims had correctly identified defendant and 
drawn the permissible inferences that the kidnapings were 
within section 209 before they reached the question of the 
meaning of imprisonment without possibility of parole. There-
after they exercised their discretion with discrimination, for 
they determined that the type of bodily harm inflicted upon 
defendant's female victims deserved a more severe punishment 
than the type of bodily harm inflicted on Waisler, victim of 
the ordinary kidnaping-robbery which constituted crime (16). 
"It is understandable that jurors, who are charged with the 
duty of fixing the penalty in the event that they find a defend-
ant guilty ... , should be interested in knowing the nature 
and effect of the penalties which they may impose; and neither 
reason nor authority indicates that the trial court should be 
prohibited from enlightening the jurors when questions are 
asked upon that subject." (People v. Osborne (1951), 37 Cal. 
2d 380, 384 [231 P .2d 850].) Upon the circumstances shown 
here, there was no error in this respect. 
The Holding of People v. Knowles (1950), supra, 35 Cal..2d 
175, 179, that Detention Dttring Armed Robbery Is Kid-
naping for the Purpose of Robbery as Defined by Section 
209 of the Penal Code, and the 1951 Amendment of Sec-
tion 209 
Defendant asks that this court reexamine its holding in 
People v. Knowles and overrule that case. His arguments are 
those advanced in the dissenting opinions of the Knowles case, 
and those rejected in People v. Tanner (1935), supra, 3 Cal.2d 
279, 293-298. They were ably presented in those cases, we 
considered them with care, and we view the question as re-
solved insofar as concerns the statute as it was cast prior to 
the 1951 amendment. 
As stated in the Knowles case (pp. 180, 183, of 35 
Cal.2d) , if section 209 was regarded as too harsh, the remedy 
was for the I.egislature to change it, not for this court to 
ehange the plain language of the section by "interpretation." 
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The Legislature has seen fit to make such a change. At the 
time of the Knowles decision section 209 (as amended in 1933 
to define detention for armed robbery as kidnaping) pro-
vided in material part that ''Every person who . . . holds 
or detains ... [another person] to commit ... robbery ... 
shall suffer death or shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the State prison for life without possibility of parole, at the 
discretion of the jury trying the same, in cases in which the 
person . . . subjected to such kidnaping suffers . . . bodily 
harm . . . '' As amended in 1951 section 209 provides in ma-
terial part, ''Any person . . . who· kidnaps or carries away 
any individual to commit robbery . . . shall suffer death or 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life 
without possibility of parole, at the discretion of the jury try-
ing the same, in cases in which the person . . . subjected to 
such kidnaping suffers . . . bodily harm. 
''Any person serving a sentence of imprisonment for life 
without possibility of parole following a conviction under 
this section as it read prior to the· eff~ctive date of this act 
shall be eligible for a release on parole as if he had been sen-
tenced to imprisonment for life with possibility of parole.'' 
[31a] The detention of the victim during the commission of 
armed robbery, if committed since the 1951 amendment, is not 
punishable under section 209. Furthermore, under that amend-
ment, all persons (such as Knowles) held under sentences of 
life imprisonment without possibility of parole for violations 
of section 209 prior to the amendment, are now eligible for 
parole. Defendant urges that the 1951 amendment also shows 
a legislative intent that the crime of armed robbery, committed 
after the 1933 amendment and prior to the later amendment, 
should not be punishable under section 209; that this legis-
lative intent applies retrospectively to offenses which were 
committed before the 1951 amendment, but as to which judg-
ment of conviction has not yet become final. If defendant were 
sentenced to suffer the death penalty for conduct amounting to 
no more than robbery with infliction of bodily harm, his argu-
ment would be relevant. (See Sekt v. Justice's Court (1945), 
26 CaL2d 297, 305 [159 P.2d 17, 167 A.L.R. 833], citing cases 
from other jurisdictions which hold that, where a statute miti-
gating punishment is enacted after commission of the offense 
but before final judgment of conviction, "the offender who 
commits an offense before the amendment of the statute impos-
ing the lighter sentence gets the benefit of the lighter punish-
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ment, upon the ground that it must have been the intention 
of the Legislature that the offender should be punished, and, 
since he can be constitutionally punished under the new stat-
ute, that should be done"; cf. ln re Fisher (1934), 1 Cal.App. 
2d 449 [36 P.2d 841]; 1n re Eyre (1934), 1 Cal.App.2d 451 
[36 P.2d 842], which hold that an amendment reducing pun-
ishment was prospective in its operation and did not aid a 
prisoner as to whom judgment of conviction became final 
before the amendment.) But the offenses for which defendant 
received the death penalty here were not mere armed rob-
beries. Defendant by threat of force transported his female 
victims-Mary for a considerable distance in defendant's car, 
Regina from the car of Lea to the car of defendant-pursu-
ant to a plan which purposed the commission of robberies and 
the infliction of bodily harm (the sex crimes) . The fact that 
Regina in being kidnaped or carried away was forced to 
move only 22 feet does not make her abduction any the less 
kidnaping within the meaning of the statute. She was taken 
from the car of her chosen escort, and from his company, to 
the car of defendant and into the latter's company and there 
detained as a virtual prisoner and forced to submit to his de-
mands. [32] It is the fact, not the distance, of forcible removal 
which constitutes kidnaping in this state. (People v. Ra1tcho 
(1935), 8 Cal.App.2d 655, 665 [47 P.2d 1108] [held, as alter-
nate ground of decision, that forcing victims to cross street 
and enter automobile constituted "kidnaping and carrying 
away"]; People v. Cook (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 625, 627 [64 
P .2d 449] [dragging victim from sidewalk into adjacent house 
constituted kidnaping]; People v. Melendrez (1938), 25 Cal. 
App.2d 490, 494 [77 P.2d 870] [defendants forced victim to 
walk 50 to 75 feet; held, they "committed an act of kidnap-
ing"] ; People v. Sh1:elds (1945), 70 Cal.App.2d 628, 630 [161 
P.2d 475] [evidence that defendant carried child from front 
of house to roof supported conviction of kidnaping] ; People 
v. Oganesoff (1947), 81 Cal.App.2d 709, 711 [184 P.2d 953] 
[evidence that defendant forcibly carried victim from auto-
mobile in front of his house into the house supported convic-
tion of kidnaping]; see Cox v. S"tate (1931), 203 Ind. 544, 550 
[177 N.E. 898, 181 N.E. 469] [carrying child 90 feet was within 
:statute which denounced forcibly carrying a person "from any 
place within this state"]; State v. Taylor (1940), 70 N.D. 
201,209 [293 N.W. 219] [victim compelled to drive defendant 
in victim's car for a very short distance; "Where asportation 
is charged, the distance removed is not material''].) 
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[31b] Because the conduct which resulted in the two death 
sentences is conduct which remains punishable by death, at the 
discretion of the jury, since the 1951 amendment of section 
209, there is no occasion for reversal or modification of those 
sentences because of that amendment. 
Double Punishment and Double Jeopardy 
[33-35] Defendant has not been put twice in jeopardy for 
any offense. The doctrine of double jeopardy has no application 
to a defendant who is tried but once on several counts. (Peo-
ple v. Amick (1942), 20 Cal.2d 247, 251 [125 P.2d 25] .) 
Defendant is correct in his contention that punishing him 
separately for the violations of section 209 of the Penal Code 
(kidnaping) and for the robberies and sex crimes which, under 
the circumstances here, are essential parts of those violations, 
would amount to double punishment, which is forbidden by 
section 654 of the Penal Code. (People v. Knowles (1950), 
supra, 35 Cal.2d 175, 189; In re Shull (1944), 23 Cal.2d 745, 
750 [146 P.2d 417] .) However, since defendant is subject to 
two validly imposed death sentences, no purpose would be 
served by reversal of other judgments of conviction. (People 
v. Smith (1950), 36 Cal.2d 444, 448 [224 P.2d 719] .) 
For the reasons above stated, the judgments and order 
appealed from are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., con-
curred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
Because, as was pointed out in the dissenting opinions of 
Mr. Justice Edmonds and myself in People v. Chessman, 35 
Cal.2d 455, 468, 469 [218 P.2d 769, 19 A.L.R.2d 1084], there 
is no adequate record upon which this court may review the 
judgments of conviction against the defendant, I would re-
verse said judgments and order denying defendant a new trial 
on that ground alone. A reading of the majority opinion, 
however, convinces me that many flagrant errors were com-
mitted during the trial which would ordinarily be held to be 
prejudicial and require the reversal of a judgment of convic-
tion. In fact, the only way I can rationalize the majority 
opinion is that those concurring therein feel that a person 
charged with 17 felonies of the character of those charged 
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against the defendant, and who represents himself, is not 
entitled to a trial in accordance with the rules applicable to 
the ordinary criminal case. I cannot subscribe to this doctrine. 
EDMONDS, J.-The judgments of conviction, including 
two which carry a sentence of death, are affirmed upon a rec-
ord which, admittedly, is not a complete transcript of the pro-
ceedings before the trial court. As I pointed out in People v. 
Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 470 [218 P.2d 769, 19 A.L.R.2d 
1084], the transcript omits certain pertinent testimony and 
was made up in a manner which does not comply with the 
Rules on Appeal. It was certified by the trial judge as a sub-
stitute for a correct record and was considered by him '' ... 
as the basis of establishing a transcript on appeal.'' 
Manifestly, this court could not make ''an examination of 
the entire cause, including the evidence" as required by the 
Constitution (Const., art. VI, § 4lj2 ) without "the entire rec-
ord of the action" to which the appellant is entitled. (Rules 
on Appeal, rule 33, subd. c.) Notwithstanding these provi-
sions, in the absence of a showing by the appellant that he has 
been prejudiced by omissions and inaccuracies in the record, 
the approximate and inexact transcript is held to be a suffi-
cient basis for reviewing the judgments of conviction. Such 
procedure, in my opinion, has taken from Chessman a sub-
stantial right. 
For these reasons, and without considering other points pre-
sented by the appellant, I would reverse the judgments of con-
viction and remand the cause for a new trial. 
A petition for a stay of remittitur and appellant's petition 
for a rehearing were denied January 15, 1952. Edmonds, 
J., and Carter, J., were of the opinion that the petition for 
a rehearing should be granted. 
